The prevailing interpretation of Article 1 of the Law on the Punishment of Illicit Exercise of Influence, enacted in 1936, constructs the actus reus of this offense around the concept of "claim of influence," treating the mere assertion of influence in exchange for obtaining money or property as sufficient for the commission of the crime, without regard to whether the alleged intervention before the relevant official actually occurs. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, the present study examines what challenges and deficiencies in here in the "claim of influence" standard and whether replacing it with the standard of "objective realization of influence-peddling" in the actus reus of this offense would remedy the identified shortcomings. The findings demonstrate that adopting this approach results in the exclusion of the actual influence-wielder engaged in brokerage from the scope of criminal liability, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the law. Furthermore, this standard draws no distinction between the promise and the objective realization of influence-peddling — a position that conflicts with the principle of proportionality between offense and punishment and gives rise to conceptual confusion with analogous offenses such as fraud. The findings of this research support the conclusion that replacing the prevailing standard with that of "objective realization of influence-peddling" would remedy the aforementioned deficiencies. To this end, relying on interpretive principles and rules, it is argued that Article 1 of the 1936 Law can be construed as encompassing the proposed standard.