Genocide, as the most severe international crime, is distinguished from other international crimes by the unique structure of its mental element. Although the emphasis on the existence of specific intent plays a fundamental role in defining this crime, in practice it faces serious difficulties in proving the perpetrator’s state of mind. One of the most important theoretical and practical challenges in this regard is determining the position of recklessness within the mental element of genocide and its relationship to specific intent. This study aims to examine the role of recklessness in the mental element of genocide and seeks to answer whether the mental element of genocide absolutely requires establishing a traditional conception of specific intent to destroy protected groups, or whether, under certain circumstances, conscious recklessness or gross negligence could function as an equivalent to pure intent. Based on descriptive analytical research, the findings indicate that a complete denial of the role of recklessness in the mental element of genocide is inconsistent with the practical realities of committing and proving this crime. At the same time, reducing recklessness merely to a tool for inferring specific intent is insufficient. Therefore, it can be concluded that, in certain situations, recognizing conscious recklessness as a functional equivalent to specific intent to destroy, wholly or partially, the protected groups represents a more logical and effective approach one that preserves the distinctive nature of genocide while better serving the interests of international criminal justice.