Abstract
Undue interference in the affairs of civil servants and public employees constitutes a structural challenge within Iran's administrative system. Far from being merely an individual misconduct, it functions as a systemic phenomenon that undermines the efficiency of executive agencies and erodes public trust—the very foundation of governmental legitimacy. Employing an analytical-interpretive methodology and drawing upon theoretical frameworks from organizational criminology and contemporary criminal policy, this study examines the capacities and deficiencies of Iran's legal system in preventing and addressing this issue. Findings indicate that although provisions such as Article 10 of the Civil Service Management Law and Article 585 of the Islamic Penal Code indirectly address this phenomenon, the absence of a clear and independent legal definition of "undue interference," the fragmentation of relevant regulations, the individualistic and reactive orientation of criminal policy, and the structural entanglement of political and administrative powers collectively impede effective enforcement. Furthermore, a politicized organizational culture , weak independent oversight mechanisms, and the lack of a comprehensive whistleblower protection system perpetuate this practice—even in the presence of formal legal provisions. The main innovation of this article lies in three levels: "the simultaneous application of organizational criminology and integrated criminal policy," "identification of the dual gap between administrative and criminal policy," and "presentation of a localized hybrid model based on Iran's legal and cultural capacities." Without such transformation, undue interference will persist as a "hidden norm" within Iran's administrative system.