Criminal policy constitutes one of the most significant forms of state intervention in the “lifeworld” of citizens. Accordingly, the manner in which criminal decisions are formulated and justified plays an important role in their legitimacy and social acceptance. However, in systems such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, where greater emphasis is placed on “instrumental rationality” and less on dialogue and mutual understanding, this pattern may contribute to the erosion of normative legitimacy. To address this condition, the present article, drawing on Jürgen Habermas’s theory of “communicative action” and his model of deliberative democracy, proposes “dialogue-oriented criminal policymaking.” The findings indicate that institutionalizing such an approach is necessary to “prevent the further deterioration of normative legitimacy,” “prevent distortions in criminal policy,” “safeguard human dignity,” and “strengthen social cohesion.” Such policymaking requires “inclusive participation of stakeholders,” “rational and ethical dialogue,” “transparency in decision-making and accountability,” “independence of dialogue from relations of domination and power,” “decision-making oriented toward mutual understanding,” and “the possibility of continuous revision of criminal decisions.” Under current conditions, however, “weak public participation and a weak culture of deliberative democracy,” “the predominance of structural authoritarianism and instrumental rationality over communicative rationality,” “the tension between the official interpretation of Sharia and Islamic jurisprudence and the requirements of dialogue-oriented policymaking,” and “legal and institutional gaps in public participation and dialogue” constitute significant obstacles to realizing this approach. Accordingly, fundamental cultural, jurisprudential, institutional, interpretive, and legal reforms are required to create the conditions for establishing dialogue-oriented criminal policymaking.