Retaliation for a bodily organ (Qiṣāṣ al-ʿuḍw)—as one of the penal sanctions within the Islamic legal system—has long been the subject of considerable attention among jurists and legal scholars. The fundamental principle in this regard is the requirement of the rule of "similarity" (mumāthalah) between the injured organ and the organ to be retaliated upon, ultimately leading to the establishment of blood money (diyah) if similarity is unattainable. However, numerous cases arise where achieving complete similarity, either in terms of the nature of the organ or the quality of the injury, is not possible.
This study, adopting a descriptive‑analytical approach, examines the perspectives of jurists and the evidentiary foundations of their reasoning concerning retaliation involving non‑similar organs, thereby highlighting the theoretical possibility of such retaliation. By relying on concepts such as the precedence of the victim's right (ḥaqq al‑mujnā ʿalayh), a broad interpretation of similarity based on functional equivalence and benefit, and the hermeneutical reinterpretation (taʾwīl) of general jurisprudential principles, the application of Qiṣāṣ to a non‑similar organ is argued to be conceivable under highly exceptional circumstances—strictly within the bounds of jurisprudential safeguards, notably the absence of corruption or severe harm (mafsadah), such as the death or severe debilitation of the offender. This possibility constitutes the innovative dimension of the present research